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Abstract
The paper describes the status of a joint project between Gemplus and ONERA 
Gemplus developed an electronic purse running on Java enabled smart cards  The
project goal is to verify security properties that should be enforced by the applets
involved in this application  A security policy has been dened that associates levels
to applet attributes and methods and denes authorized ows between levels  We
propose a technique based on model checking to verify that actual information ows
between applets are authorized 
  Context and case study
   Open smart cards
A new type of smart cards is getting more and more attractive  multiapplica
tion smart cards The main characteristics of such cards are that applications
can be loaded after the card issuance and that several applications run on the
same card A few operating systems have been proposed to manage multiap
plication smart cards namely Java Card
 
 Multos

and more recently Smart
Cards for Windows

 In this paper we will focus on Java Card Following
this standard applications for multiapplication smart cards are implemented
as interacting Java applets
 
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  Case study
A typical example of a multiapplication smart card is an electronic purse with
one purse applet and two loyalty applets  a frequent yer Air France applica
tion and a car rental RentaCar loyalty program The purse applet manages
debit and credit operations and keeps a log of all the transactions As several
moneys can be used francs and euros for example this applet also manages
a conversion table When the card owner wants to subscribe to a loyalty pro
gram the corresponding loyalty applet is loaded on the card This applet
must be able to interact with the purse to get to know the transactions made
by the purse in order to update loyalty points according to these transactions
For instance the Air France applet will add miles to the account of the card
owner whenever an Air France ticket is bought with the purse The card owner
can use these miles to buy a discounted Air France ticket Agreements may
also exist between loyalty applets to allow exchanges of points For instance
loyalty points granted by RentaCar could be summed with Air France miles
to buy a discounted ticket
The electronic purse has been chosen as case study for our project It has
been implemented in Java by Gemplus
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Fig    An electronic purse
 Security concerns
Security is always a big concern for smart cards but it is all the more impor
tant with multiapplication smart cards and post issuance code downloading
Multiapplication smart cards involve several participants  the card provider
the card issuer that proposes the card to the users application providers and
card holders users The card issuer is usually considered responsible for the
security of the card The card issuer does not trust application providers 
applets could be malicious or simply faulty
Java Security functions like the byte code verier or the security manager
	
 were designed to prevent malicious applets from damaging local ressources
These functions carefully isolate a malicious applet from other applets and
from sensitive ressources To allow the development of multiapplication smart
cards the JavaCard has introduced a new way for applets to interact directly
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An applet can invoke another applet method through a shared interface In
the electronic purse application the purse applet has a shared interface for
loyalty applets to get their transactions and the loyalty applet has a shared
interface for partner loyalty applets to get loyalty points As applet interaction
is outside the scope of usual Java security functions Java card dened a new
security function called the applet rewall 
 This security function controls
that only methods in a shared interface can be called
We suppose that all the relevant Java and JavaCard security functions are
used in the electronic purse But these functions do not cover all the threats
We are especially interested in threats particular to multiapplication smart
cards like illicit applet interactions An example of illicit interaction in the
case of the electronic purse is described on the following scheme 
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Fig    Applet Interactions
A logfull service is proposed by the purse to the loyalty applets  when
the transaction log is full the purse calls the logfull method of the loyalty
applets that subscribed to the service to warn them that the log is full and
they should get the transactions before some of them are erased and replaced
by new ones We suppose the Air France applet subscribed to the logfull ser
vice but the RentaCar applet did not When the log is full the purse calls
the logfull method of the Air France applet In this method the Air France
applet gets transactions from the purse but also wants to update its extended
balance that contains its points plus all the points it can get from its loyalty
partners To update this extended balance it calls the getbalance method of
the RentaCar loyalty applet In that case the car rental applet can guess that
the log is full when the Air France applet calls its getbalancemethod and thus
get the transactions from the purse There is a leak of information from the
Air France applet to the RentaCar one and we want to be able to detect such
illicit information ows
This illicit behaviour would not be countered by the applet rewall as all
the invoked methods belong to shared interfaces Our goal is to provide tech
niques and tools enabling the card issuer to verify that new applets respect
existing security properties dened as authorized applet interactions The ap

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proach can be described by the following scheme 
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Fig    Applet Certication
If the applet provider wants to load a new applet on a card he provides
the bytecode for this applet The card issuer has a security policy for the card
and security properties that must be satised We provide techniques and
tools to decide whether the properties are satised by the new applet these
techniques are applied on the applet bytecode If the properties hold the
applet can be loaded on the card if they do not hold it is rejected
 Multiapplication Security Policy
To implement this applet certication approach we rst have to choose a se
curity policy adapted to multiapplication cards and associated security prop
erties
  Security policy
We propose to use a multilevel security policy 
 that was designed for multi
application smart cards Each applet provider is assigned a security level and
we consider special levels for shared data On the example of the electronic
purse we have a level for each applet  AF for Air France P for purse and
RC for RentaCar and levels for shared data  AF  RC for data shared by
Air France and RentaCar AF  P for data shared by Air France and purse
etc The relation between levels   is used to authorize or forbid information
ows between applets In the policy we consider AF P   AF and AF P
  P  this means that information whose level is AF  P is authorized to
ow towards information whose level is P or AF  So shared information from
Air France and Purse may be received by Air France and Purse applets To
model that applets may only communicate through shared interfaces direct
ows between levels AF  P and RC are forbidden
The levels together with the   relation have a lattice structure so there
are a bottom level public and a top level private The following picture shows
some of the authorized information ows

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Fig    Authorized information ows
 Security properties
Now we have to dene the security properties to be enforced We have chosen
the secure dependency model 
 that applies to systems where malicious ap
plications might communicate condential information to other applications
Like other information ow models such as noninterference 
 this model
ensures that dependencies between system variables cannot be exploited to
establish an indirect communication channel We apply this model to the
electronic purse  illicit interactions will be detected by controlling the depen
dencies between variables of the system
To apply this model we should rst be able to associate a security level
with input and output variables and check that the value of a variable whose
security level is l depends on the value of variables whose security level is
dominated by l This means that any pair of runs of the program starting with
the same values for all variables whose level is dominated by l should compute
the same values for variables whose level is l This property is not easy to
check with computer aided verication tools so we use sucient conditions
that are better handled by these tools
It is easy to compute for each variable of the program the set of vari
ables it syntactically depends on As the values of these variables determine
the values computed by the program it is sucient to prove that a variable
whose security level is l syntactically depends on variables with a security level
dominated by l
Because it is not always possible to associate a security level with all the
variables we dene the computed level of a variable The computed level of
an input variable is its security level Otherwise the computed level is the
least upper bound of the computed levels of variables the variable syntactically
depends on To check security it is sucient to prove that in any state of the
program the computed level of a variable is dominated by its security level
As we want to use model checkers to verify the security properties it is
important to restrict the size of value domains in order to avoid state explo
sions during verications To check security it is sucient to prove that the

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previous property holds in any state of an abstracted program where variable
values are replaced with variable computed levels
 Applet certication
  Global Analysis Technique
There are two issues in order to be able to apply the approach in practice 
what are the variables we are able to associate a security level with and
what is the program we have to consider   one method of one applet all the
methods in one applet all the methods in all the applets on the card
We are able to associate security levels with applet attributes and with
method invokations between applets By default we associate level AF resp
P and RC with all the attributes of Air France resp Purse and RentaCar
applet As Air France can invoke the getbalance or debitmethods of RentaCar
we assign the shared security level RC AF to these interactions Similarly
as the Purse applet can invoke the logfull method of Air France we associate
levelAFP to this interaction And we associate level PAF resp PRC
to the invocation of getTransaction method of the Purse applet by the Air
France applet resp by RentaCar applet
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Fig    AssumeGuarantee Verication
We have decided to analyse one method invokation at a time We pro
pose an assumeguarantee discipline that allows to verify methods locally on
each applet even if the method calls methods in other applets through shared
interfaces For instance method logfull of applet Air France calls method
getbalance of RentaCar we will analyse both methods separately We check
that in the logfull method of the Air France applet the level of parameters of
the getbalancemethod invokation is dominated by the level of this interaction
ie RCAF  And we assume that RCAF is the level of the result of this
method invokation When we analyse the getbalancemethod in the RentaCar
applet we will check that the level of the result of this method is dominated
by the level of the interaction and we will assume that RC AF is the level
of the parameters of the getbalance method
We adopt the same discipline for the attributes inside an applet When
an attribute is read we assume that its level is the security level that was
associated with it When the attribute is modied we check that the new level

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is dominated by the security level of this attribute This assumeguarantee
discipline inside an applet allows to verify only a set of selected methods at a
time not the whole applet
 Local Analysis Technique
Our method to verify the security property on the application byte code is
based on three elements 
 
abstraction  we abstract all values of variables by computed levels
 
sucient condition  we verify an invariant that is a sucient condition of
the security property
 
model checking  we verify this invariant by model checking
We illustrate our technique on a simplied version of Air France logfull
method This method directly invokes method getbalance of the RentaCar
applet and updates the ExtendedBalance eld
Method void logfull 
 aload
 invokespecial  Method int getbalance 
 istore
	 aload

 dup
 getfield  Field int ExtendedBalance
 iload
 iadd
 putfield  Field int ExtendedBalance
	 return
Abstraction
The logfull byte code is modelled by an SMV 
 module that involves
the following variables 
 
pc  program counter
 
memi
  an array modelling the memory locations
 
stcki
  an array modelling the operand stack
 
sP   stack pointer
 
ByteCode  the name of the current instruction
The values of the variables are abstracted into levels Levels are dened in
a module called Levels in such a way that a level is represented by a boolean
Hence the types of abstracted variables are boolean or array of boolean We
do not abstract the value of the program counter that gives the sequencing of
instructions we keep unchanged the value of the stack pointer that gives the
index of the rst empty slot and the value of the current instruction
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L levels
pc  
mem  array  of boolean
stck  array  of boolean
sP  
ByteCode  invoke load return nop store dup
load getfieldop putfield
The byte code execution starts at program location  Initially the stack
is empty the level of the method parameter is stored in memory location 
it is equal to the level of the interaction we are analysing ie level AF  P 
that is encoded as the conjunction of levels L AF and L P 
init pc  init sP  init mem LAF  LP
for  i i  ii init stcki  LAF  LP 
The control loop denes the value of the program counter and of the current
instruction It is an almost direct translation of the Java byte code When
pc is equal to  then the execution is nished and the current instruction is
nop that does nothing As in 
 each instruction we consider models various
instructions of the Java byte code For instance as we do not care about
the type of memory and stack locations instruction load  represents Java
instructions aload i iload i lload i Similarly the op instruction models
all the binary operations as iadd ladd iand ior 
Although methods in the Electronic Purse case study tend to be rather
short the value domain of the pc variable is generally the larger domain in
the SMV model we generate As a large value domain can be a source of state
explosion for model checkers it is interesting to reduce it We consider that
the next value of pc is pc   except of course in the case of conditional or
jump instructions In this example the domain of pc is  that is smaller
that the original domain 
 next pc ByteCode 
switch pc 
   nop
   pc load 
   pc invoke 
   pc store 
   pc load 
   pc dup 
	   pc getfield 

   pc load 
   pc op 
   pc putfield 
    return


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The following section of the SMV model describes the eect of the instruc
tions on the variables The instructions compute levels for each variable The
load instruction pushes the level of a memory location on the stack the store
instruction pops the top of the stack and stores this level in a memory loca
tion the dup instruction duplicates on the stack the top of the stack The
op instruction computes the least upper bound of the levels of the two rst
locations of the stack The least upper bound of levels l and l is modelled
by the disjunction of two levels l  l The invoke instruction pops from
the stack the parameter and pushes onto the stack the result of this method
invokation According to the assumeguarantee discipline we assume that the
level of the result of method getbalance is L AF L RC Instruction getfield
pushes on the top of the stack the level of attribute ExtendedBalance that
is L AF  And nally instruction putfield pops from the stack the level of
attribute ExtendedBalance
switch ByteCode 
nop 
load  next stcksP memnext sPsP
load  next stcksP memnext sPsP
store  next memstcksP next sPsP
dup  next stcksP stcksP next sPsP
op  next stcksP stcksPstcksP
next sPsP
invoke  next stcksPLAF  LRCnext sP sP
getfield  next stcksPLAF
putfield  next sPsP
return  

Invariant
We explained above how to compute a level for each variable We also
explained what security level we assigned to attributes and interactions The
invariant we verify is then that the computed level of variables we want to
control is always lower than the authorized level
For the logfull method we should check two properties   one to veriy that
the interaction between logfull and getbalance is correct and the other one
to check that logfull correctly uses attribute ExtendedBalance Property
Smethod  means that whenever the current instruction is the invokation
of method getbalance then the level of the transmitted parameters the top
of the stack is dominated by the level of the interaction AF RC Property
Sfield  means that whenever the current instruction is the modication
of eld ExtendedBalance then the level of the new value the top of the
stack is dominated by the level of the attribute AF 
As logfull does not return any value there is no need to verify property
Sresult which means that whenever the method is nished the level of the

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return value the top of the stack is dominated by the level of the interaction
AF  P
Smethod 
assert G  ByteCodeinvoke  stcksP  LAF  LRC
Sfield 
assert G  ByteCodeputfield  stcksP  LAF
Sresult 
assert G  ByteCodereturn   stcksP  LAF  LP
 Analysis Example
Once we have the abstract model and the invariant we model check the in
variant properties on the model using SMV 
 If the property does not hold
the model checker produces a countermodel that represents an execution of
the byte code leading to a state where the property is violated
A security problem will be detected when checking property Smethod 
of method logfull Indeed the logfull interaction between purse and Air
France has AF P level The getbalance channel has AF RC level and we
detect that the invocation of the getbalancemethod depends on the invocation
of the logfull method There is thus an illicit dependency from a variable of
level AF  P to an object of level AF RC cf gure 
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Fig  	  Illicit interaction detection
 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an approach for the certication of applets
that are to be loaded on a Javacard The security checks we propose are
complementary to the security functions already present on the card The
applet rewall controls the interaction between two applets while our analysis
has a more global view and is able to detect illicit information ow between
several applets

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  Related work
A lot of work has been going on about security and Java but to our knowl
edge it does not deal with security properties as we understand it in this
paper illicit interactions Instead they are concerned with properties like
correct typing no stack overow etc One exception is 
 which proposes a
verication of control ows but does not deal with information ow
Among this work two kinds of approaches can be distinguished depending
on the technique used for the verication Most of the approaches are based
on static analysis techniques particularly type systems 
 One approach
has used model checking with SMV to specify Java byte code 
 but again
to verify a dierent kind of properties
 Future work
Future work includes the automatization of the production of an SMV model
from Java byte code However a complete automatization is hardly possible 
an interaction with the user will be needed for the denition of levels for
interactions and attributes
Another interesting issue is the analysis of results When SMV produces
a counterexample for a security property we have to study how to interpret
this counterexample at the application level
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